

## *Summary*

*[A shortened version of the report made by Mécrove Gijsberts and Jaco Dagevos]*

### *Developments in integration, the main features*

This annual report presents an overview of the position of *non-Western* ethnic minorities and their descendants in Dutch society. This 2009 edition will focus on developments in integration and illustrate how the position of non-Western ethnic minorities has developed over a broad range of fields. What are the major trends in integration today? To answer this question properly we need to make a distinction between long and short-term developments.

There are a number of longer-term positive developments and, on the whole, it can be said that developments are steadily moving in the right direction, although still relatively slowly. One positive trend is, for example, the increasing stream of members of non-Western groups into higher education and, as a result, a general increase in the education level of non-Western minorities. More and more members of these groups have a command of the Dutch language and use it with their partners and children. These changes are stimulated by a demographic development - the increasing numbers of the second generation in most minority groups. As a result, the employment market is showing a noticeable improvement: the employment position is improving slowly but surely, entrepreneurs from the ethnic minorities are becoming increasingly successful and a gradual reduction in the number of non-Western households living in poverty and dependent on state benefits is becoming apparent. On the housing market, too, there has been a clear improvement in the position of ethnic minorities: they are more likely to own their own homes and have more living space. Very often this means moving from the major cities to the surrounding areas (suburbanization).

Women from ethnic minorities have fewer children, and later in life. This holds particularly true for the second generation. Women from ethnic minorities are becoming increasingly similar to their Dutch counterparts. The falling birth-rate among women from non-Western backgrounds is probably one of the reasons for their greater participation on the employment market in recent years. The number of Turkish and Moroccan women in employment has increased significantly in the last decade, and this has meant that their employment position and economic independence has improved too. Surinamese Dutch women could be used as a role model for women from other ethnic minority groups, and for their Dutch counterparts too, since they are much more likely to work full-time or in extended part-time jobs, which makes them more likely to be economically independent.

From 2001 to 2007, proportionally fewer Turkish Dutch and Moroccan Dutch people living in the Netherlands sought a marital partner from their country of origin. Although this group very rarely chooses an indigenous Dutch person as a partner, they tend to opt for a partner from their own ethnic group who was born in the Netherlands but recent figures indicate an increase in the number of immigrants coming to the Netherlands to marry.

Economic developments have had a disruptive effect on the employment market. The impact of the credit crisis became clearly visible in the first half of 2009. Unemployment increased markedly among non-Western ethnic groups, with young people being particularly affected. One in five of this group is now unemployed (in the second quarter 2009). The fact that many young people of non-Western origin are not well enough qualified to enter the job market is now having repercussions. Although greater numbers from the minority groups enter further education, less than half of the young adults of Turkish and Moroccan origin who are no longer at school have any basic qualifications. In addition, their overrepresentation in temporary jobs puts them in a vulnerable position.

Although the image of ethnic minorities remains unpromising, we see no indications that the general economic situation is resulting in more negative views. In fact, attitudes seem, on average, to have been developing in a more positive rather than negative direction. The recent economic depression may, conceivably, have pushed the problems associated with minority groups into the background somewhat.

In addition to the unfavourable economic situation, there are signs of other, far from positive, developments. Segregation in the home and school is considerable and seems to be increasing rather than decreasing. Numerous neighbourhoods can be found in the larger cities, in particular, where very few indigenous Dutch people live and non-Western pupils have few classmates of indigenous origin. Many non-Western minorities are disadvantaged on the employment market, as evidenced by their low participation in employment and high dependency on benefits. Social distance between the groups is great as well. In past years, informal contacts between non-Western and indigenous groups have not increased. The mutual lack of understanding between the various population groups is great, particularly between Muslims and non-Muslims. Ethnic pupils are slowly catching up in education. There is some progress but at its current rate it will take many years for the gap to be narrowed. The relatively large language deficiencies are a major factor here. Integration policies are centred on improving the language proficiency of ethnic groups, but so far the numbers successfully completing the integration courses have remained low. In recent years whilst 10,000 participants have met the requirements for citizenship, many of these have not yet completed their citizenship courses.

It is clear that progress must be made by the younger second-generation groups. As we have already mentioned, positive developments can certainly be discerned among the younger generation, but there are still considerable problems among the non-Western youth. They are more likely to grow up in single-parent households, to have behavioural problems and both physical and mental health problems. In addition, the school drop-out rate is higher among non-Western young people and overrepresentation in the crime statistics is high, particularly among youths of Moroccan and Antillean origin. The future does not look promising for a considerable proportion of non-Western young people

#### *Great diversity of groups*

Within this general picture there are many differences. When the various features of integration are examined, the position of people of *Somali* origin in the Netherlands is a source of particular concern. This group manifests the highest level of dependency on benefits; more than one third of people of Somali origin people between the ages of 15 and 65 receive social security. In sharp contrast with other minority groups, their dependence on benefits has not decreased over the last decade. This can be explained in part by the migration history of this group. Many have only been in the Netherlands for a relatively short time: about 30% of first-generation Somalis have been in the Netherlands for less than four years. Furthermore, over recent years, a significant number have moved from the Netherlands to the United Kingdom and there are indications that these emigrants were mainly those who had a higher education, although most Somalis in the Netherlands were not highly-educated in the first place. This is illustrated by the performance of school-age children which is the poorest of all ethnic minority groups and the risk that they will drop

out of school is relatively high. Of all the children in the Netherlands, these are the ones most likely to be living in one-parent households. In addition, the high proportion of young Somalis referred to Halt<sup>1</sup>, which was higher in 2008 than for young people of Antillean and Moroccan origin, is an indication of the problematic situation of this group. One mitigating factor, it may be said, is that the Somali group in the Netherlands is relatively small - about 22,000 people.

The picture of the situation of the refugee groups is far from complete. A survey which is being conducted at the moment should provide greater clarity about the position of people from Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan in the course of next year but it is clear that the outlook is not bright for first-generation immigrants. Their position on the employment market is weak and their dependency on social security is very high. The proportion of Afghans and Iraqis in the Netherlands who are receiving social security is somewhere between that of the Somalis and Iranians - 30% of the Iraqis receive social security and 23% of the Afghans. The proportionately large number of newcomers has a significant influence on the position of the Iraqi group in the Netherlands; about 20% of the Iraqi ethnic minority has been here for less than four years and about 40% have been in the Netherlands from between five to nine years. Among those of Afghan origin, the proportion which has been living in the Netherlands for less than four years is a little smaller, and the group living between five to nine years is slightly larger than the Iraqis. Another noticeable feature is the relatively large number of entrepreneurs among the Afghan group. On the whole, however, the position of first-generation Afghans and Iraqis is not good. The second generation, however, seems to be doing better, as shown by the relatively large number in havo or vwo education<sup>2</sup>: 35% of the Iraqi students and 42% of the Afghans in the third year of secondary education study at a havo or vwo school. In comparison, the figures for Surinamese students are 34%, Turkish students 22% and for their indigenous counterparts it is 48%.

The picture is a great deal rosier for people of *Iranian* origin - a predominantly highly-educated and modern group - than for any of the groups just mentioned. A factor here is the longer residence period of Iranian immigrants in the Netherlands than the groups from Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia. That it is clearly a question of elite migration in the case of the Iranians is borne out by various characteristics. The children of Iranian immigrants perform well at school; the proportion of young people with an Iranian background in havo or vwo education is even higher than that of their Dutch counterparts. Evidence of the group's modern attitudes is revealed by the birth-rate among Iranian women in the Netherlands and that they have their children at a later age. Even indigenous Dutch women bear more children and at an earlier age than Iranian women in the Netherlands. The large number of people with Dutch or dual nationality is also noticeable; this is one factor which distinguishes them from members of the other refugee groups mentioned, and also from people of Turkish and Moroccan origin who have generally been in the Netherlands for a considerably longer period of time. This does not imply, however, that the Iranian minority can be said to be fully and successfully integrated in Dutch society. Of the Iranians in the Netherlands aged 15-65 years, 18% receive social security (in contrast to 1.6 % of the native Dutch). Despite the fact that this proportion has fallen over the past ten years because of their longer period of residence and economic developments, it is still very high. The large number of Iranian entrepreneurs in the Netherlands is also noticeable.

The position of people of *Chinese* origin is rather different from that of other groups in the Netherlands and is characterized by its self-reliance. Many of them are independent business people and very few are dependent on social security. Young Chinese people in the Netherlands, in particular, have very good prospects here due, in principle, to their excellent school performance. The number of Chinese pupils in havo or vwo education is considerably higher than that of their Dutch counterparts and the number of young people of

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<sup>1</sup> [tr. Note] Halt Bureau is part of a scheme of out-of-court settlements offered to juvenile offenders, involving community service or educational tasks.

<sup>2</sup> [tr.note] havo - a five-year course of general secondary education; vwo - university preparatory education

Chinese origin referred to Halt is also very low. The outlook is less favourable for young indigenous people, and even more so for young people from other ethnic minorities.

No matter how interesting the various integration patterns for these particular groups may be, it is important to bear in mind that these groups are not large. In total only 190,000 persons are involved; the largest of the smaller groups are the Iraqi and Chinese groups, each represented by roughly 50,000 people. The four, large, traditional non-Western groups (those of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean origin) add up to a total of 1.2 million people.

Of all the four larger non-Western groups, the image of the group of *Surinamese* origin is the least promising. To some extent this is because this group has had to cope with the lowest immigration figures of any of the non-Western groups. Currently there are almost 339,000 people of Surinamese origin living in the Netherlands. In many areas their situation is often the best of all the non-Western groups. The favourable employment market position of Surinamese women has already been mentioned; they are equally likely to be in employment as their indigenous counterparts and are economically independent even more often. Very few Surinamese people have difficulty with the Dutch language. There are a sizable number of mixed partnerships, which has certainly given the Surinamese group the reputation of being integrated, but this picture is not entirely accurate. In many areas, the group has a considerable disadvantage in comparison with native Dutch people; this is evidenced by higher unemployment, greater benefit-dependency and more educational disadvantages. In general, Surinamese people in the Netherlands are more similar to non-Western groups on position indicators in social networks than they are to native Dutch people, and, in some areas, the position of the Surinamese group is developing in a less promising way than that of other groups. By the time Turkish and Moroccan pupils have reached their final year of primary school, their arithmetic skills have already overtaken those of their Surinamese peers. Although the unemployment figures of the Surinamese group were lower than those of Turkish and Moroccan groups in the 90s, the gap between them is now much smaller. The relative improvement in the labour market position of Surinamese people is also progressing at a much slower rate than that of the workforce of other non-Western groups.

The group of *Antillean* origin is comprised of about 135,000 persons and can be divided into two groups. The first group contains the section of the community that has been living in the Netherlands for a long time and whose children are doing well in various areas. But the position of the other group of Antilleans who have only recently migrated to the Netherlands and who are mainly from Curacao is much more problematic. Unemployment figures for this group are high, benefit-dependency is quite prevalent and the number of teenage mothers is very high. The group is heavily overrepresented in the crime figures too: 12.9% of adult males over the age of 12 in the Antillean population have been suspected of committing a criminal offence, a figure which is much higher than that of the indigenous population at 2.1%. The proportion of women displaying criminal behaviour is also greater in the Antillean group than in any other. Criminal behaviour such as this also continues to a much later age in the Antillean community; in other groups criminal behaviour starts to decrease at around the age of twenty to twenty-five years.

The poor performance of Antillean pupils in primary schools is also a cause of concern and there seems to have been little improvement made over the years. The Antillean community's position on the housing market appears to be stagnant and, according to some indicators like house size, the proportion of owner-occupiers and housing satisfaction, it seems to be deteriorating. Migrants who have arrived in recent years have changed the group's composition, and the image of the Antilleans in the Netherlands seems increasingly to be one of disadvantage. Despite all this, there are some favourable developments among the Antillean community. The pass rate of Antillean pupils in havo and vwo education is high and the proportion of (second-generation) Antillean pupils in higher education is often greater than it is for all the other groups. Between 1996 and 2008 the second generation, in particular, found higher employment positions on the labour market and second-generation Antilleans' share of this sector is now greater than that of their native counterparts.

And what can we say about the position of the two largest minority groups in the Netherlands: the *Turkish Dutch* community (378,000) and the *Moroccan Dutch* community (342,000)? Because of the heavy overrepresentation of Moroccan youngsters in the crime figures and in records of other problematic behaviour, Moroccan youths are regarded as generally being less well integrated than Turkish youth, who cause much less nuisance. It is debatable, however, whether this is correct in all respects. It has become evident, for example, that Moroccans students are making more progress in education than their Turkish peers. Young people from the Turkish community encounter significant problems in the course of their education. This is possibly due to the inward looking nature of the Turkish community, which seems to create a barrier to their learning Dutch. This language disadvantage appears to be *the* specific factor which prevents pupils of Turkish origin from progressing at school. Turkish pupils have a large language disadvantage by the time they are in the final year of primary school, larger than that of Moroccan pupils. It is clear that the latter are making more progress in the Dutch language at primary school than pupils of Turkish origin. Their poorer performance at primary school is reflected in the low numbers of Turkish pupils who are recommended for havo or vwo education and the number of Turkish pupils attending havo or vwo is increasing more slowly than it is in the other groups. Pupils of Turkish origin are more likely to have to repeat years or to be less successful at passing exams.

Between 1994 and 2004 the number of people of Turkish origin who had contact with native Dutch people in their free time decreased and the same is true of the second generation. It is not clear how far the relatively strong focus on their own group influences their views on such topics as 'experienced equality of opportunity' but, of all the non-Western groups, the Turkish Dutch are the most pessimistic about this issue. Relatively few think that the Netherlands welcomes migrants and that it is a country offering plenty of opportunity. Many Turkish people feel unsafe considerably more often than members of other non-Western groups or the indigenous community. In addition, fewer Turkish people than members of other non-Western groups think that they are well integrated. This community would find the greatest difficulty in accepting the situation if one of their children chose a native Dutch partner. Turkish Dutch people do not compare unfavourably with other non-Western groups on the employment market. Unemployment among them was 10% in the second quarter of 2009; this was slightly less than the percentage of unemployed in the other large non-Western groups. Many Turkish Dutch people receive benefit, very often incapacity benefit. Viewed over a period of roughly ten years, considerably more people of Turkish origin have found work, unemployment has fallen and there are fewer Turks receiving social security. This development is being hindered by the recent economic recession but this is a factor which affects all the groups. A noticeable characteristic of the Turkish Dutch community is the high number of self-employed entrepreneurs among them, which has increased markedly in the last decade. This may be related to the strong group connections which result in members setting up their own independent businesses and within their own circle. There is also a possible connection between the group's cohesion and criminality; in comparison with other non-Western groups, there are far fewer people of Turkish origin registered as criminal suspects (although this proportion is three times higher than that of indigenous Dutch people).

*Moroccan Dutch* people in the Netherlands do not enjoy a particularly good image. They owe this dubious honour to some extent because of their overrepresentation in the crime figures. In crime statistics, people of Moroccan origin rank just below those of Antillean origin in registrations as criminal suspects. The minors in this group (12-17 years) represent the highest percentage of suspects of all non-Western groups: 15.9%. Criminality is higher amongst the second generation (12-24 years) than amongst the first-generation of Moroccan origin but unlike the Antillean group, criminality amongst the Moroccan Dutch falls rapidly from the age of 20 onwards.

One interesting hypothesis is that the high crime rate in the Moroccan Dutch community is attributable to the looser group relations and the closer contacts that Moroccan youths have with the native Dutch population compared to the Turkish-Dutch group. These closer contacts are also reflected in their greater mastery of the Dutch language. Proficiency in the Dutch language has improved among those of Moroccan origin in

recent years, more so than it has among the Turkish community. This has given the Moroccan Dutch pupils a greater advantage at primary-school level, where they achieve better language results and make faster progress than their Turkish Dutch peers. Moroccan Dutch pupils are increasingly being recommended for havo or vwo education, showing a greater increase than in the other groups.

Unemployment in the Moroccan Dutch group is the highest of all large non-Western groups, although the differences are smaller than they were ten years ago. This group is also more likely to be receiving social security benefits. One promising development is the increased representation of second-generation Moroccan Dutch in higher employment positions: there has been a spectacular increase in their numbers in higher and academic positions over the past decade. The Moroccan community is particularly concerned about the image of Islam which currently holds sway among the indigenous Dutch community. To a greater extent than the Turkish Dutch community, they think that Islam is regarded far too negatively in the Netherlands and that the Dutch population has no respect for Islamic culture. Religion is very important for many of Moroccan origin and in recent years there has been an increase in the numbers of their second-generation attending the mosque; this has not been the case for the first generation of Moroccan origin or for both generations of Turkish origin.

### *General picture in ten themes*

#### *1 Demographic developments*

##### *Rising immigration and falling emigration*

In recent years, immigration has been rising once more, due mainly to the influx of migrants from other European countries (principally from Poland). Immigration by non-Western migrants started to increase in 2008 but, as yet, is far from 2000-2002 levels. Emigration fell after 2006, mainly among non-Western migrants. There is now not only a downward trend in the number of first-generation groups who are emigrating but the increase in second-generation emigration seems to have come to an end as well. In 2008 emigration amongst all four large migrant groups fell.

##### *Numbers of second generation increase*

On 1 January 2009 there were 1.8 million members of non-Western ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, some 11% of the total population. Two thirds of this number belonged to the four large groups (people of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Antillean origin). While the numbers of the first generation in all four groups are decreasing, the numbers of the second generation are increasing, and almost half of the second generation of the four larger groups of non-Western origin was born in the Netherlands. The first generation of refugee groups continues to rise but only to a limited extent, and the second generation is also expanding at a greater rate than the first.

##### *Number of children born to second-generation women virtually identical to indigenous women*

The birth-rate is falling among non-Western ethnic minorities, in particular. The fertility pattern of second-generation women is becoming increasingly similar to that of their native Dutch counterparts. These women are bearing fewer children than the previous generation and the number of children being born is now comparable to that of native Dutch women. The average age that second-generation non-Western women are when they have children is becoming comparable to that of indigenous mothers. The rise in the average birth-rate in the Netherlands is entirely attributable to native Dutch women.

##### *Many citizens of Moroccan or Turkish origin have dual nationality*

Keeping one's own nationality is sometimes regarded as a factor which impedes the integration of non-Western migrants. As a rule, Dutch citizens are only allowed to have one nationality, but there are numerous exceptions to this, and the majority of naturalized Dutch

citizens tend to retain their original nationality too. There are now 1.1 million Dutch citizens with dual nationality, mainly of Turkish or Moroccan origin, and more than 80% of the second generation have dual nationality.

#### *No increase in mixed marriages among Turkish and Moroccan ethnic minorities*

Of all the non-western partnerships (married and unmarried), 30% are mixed relationships, in which one of the partners is of indigenous origin and the other of non-Western origin. Mixed relationships are much more common among those of Antillean or Surinamese origin than among those of Turkish or Moroccan origin. For years, the percentage of marriages with an indigenous Dutch person has been stable in the Turkish and Moroccan communities: one in ten men or women from these groups marries a native Dutch person.

#### *Fall in migration marriages between 2001-2007*

Since 2002 there has been a fall in the number of marriages of people of Turkish or Moroccan origin with partners who have been brought to the Netherlands from their countries of origin. More than half of those of Turkish origin entered into a migration marriage in 2001 but this percentage fell to 20% in 2007. After 2004 the numbers fell dramatically, which may have been the result of the more stringent requirements which were imposed at the end of 2004 on immigration for the purposes of family formation. The majority of Turkish Dutch and Moroccan Dutch still marry a partner from their own ethnic community but they increasingly choose one from their community in the Netherlands. In 2008 this development started to level off, but there are signs of an increase in the numbers of migration marriages; absolute numbers, however, are still considerably lower than those at the beginning of this century.

## *2 Civic integration in the Netherlands*

### *Many changes to the system of civic integration*

In 2007 the integration system underwent a thorough overhaul, followed by various amendments and adjustments. These changes were intended to reach more potential participants and involve them in integration programmes. Minimum targets have been set for integration examinations in an attempt to raise the average standard for integration. In addition, local authorities and market parties have shown that they are increasingly adept at organizing the courses. The quality of the integration programmes on offer is now being examined in much greater detail and much more attention is being paid to dual programmes. Nevertheless, many integration projects failed to run smoothly in the first year after the introduction of the new system. It is difficult to avoid concluding that local authorities are still encountering problems in their implementation of citizenship policy, despite the new government measures which were introduced in the 'integration master plan'. It seems particularly difficult to find enough potential participants and to attract them to the programmes on offer.

### *Too little known about prospects after civic integration programme*

The number of programmes which have started and been completed give an indication of the actual results that can be achieved with civic integration. The information gathered by the ISI (Information System Integration) relates mainly to intake numbers and pass rates: it reveals that intake numbers increased after a difficult first year. In 2008 about 40,000 integration programmes were started but as this number is still lower than the projections had estimated, we must conclude that intake numbers are still lagging behind expectations. It has also become clear that pass-rates for individual examinations are high, with percentages varying from 75 to more than 90 depending on the subject. The number of people complying with the requirements since the introduction of the Civic Integration Act is still comparatively low - more than 10,000. The closing date for integration, however, is still open for many candidates, so that the statistics on participation and completion must be approached with the necessary caution.

No information is available for any follow-up activities such as employment, education or participation in Dutch social life. So it is clear that the information available to us about civic integration is still patchy and relates mainly to the integration process itself. The extent of the results which will be achieved by this integration programme is a question which is increasingly challenging in the Netherlands; the options for participation via a broad band of social connections, such as the neighbourhood, education and the employment market are particularly interesting.

*The Civic Integration Abroad Act's influence on the size of migration*

The Civic Integration Abroad Act came into force in 2006 and was designed to introduce a system for immigrants which would enable them to sit an examination in their country of origin before applying for a visa for the Netherlands. Only a few cautious conclusions can be drawn about the effect that the Civic Integration Abroad Act has had. It is known that the vast majority of entrants pass this test. One of the side-effects has been that the number of applications for temporary residence permits has fallen substantially since the introduction of this law. In this respect, it can be said that this measure has influenced the level of migration to the Netherlands but it is as yet uncertain whether this test helps the migrants with their further integration in the Netherlands. A cautionary conclusion might be that the test outside the Netherlands puts candidates in a slightly better position for the further course of their integration in the Netherlands.



### 3 Education

#### *Slow reduction in disadvantage at start of primary education*

Initial disadvantages at primary school are slowly decreasing for children of Turkish or Moroccan parents but the gap between these children with their Dutch counterparts is still sizable, especially in their language skills. One positive development is that children of Turkish or Moroccan origin now regularly take part in pre-school and early learning programmes and there has been a spectacular increase in their numbers at playschool over the last ten years. This means that these children are now easier to reach before they start primary school.

#### *Proficiency in Dutch language low at end of primary education, especially among pupils of Turkish origin*

At the end of primary education, there is still a considerable language disadvantage for non-Western pupils, particularly in their language skills. Pupils of Turkish origin have the greatest disadvantage; they leave primary school with an average language level which is comparable to that of their nine-year-old indigenous counterparts. During the course of their education Moroccan Dutch pupils show the greatest improvement in language skills but the process is still slow. The gap is closing much more quickly in arithmetic; pupils of Moroccan or Turkish origin have approximately halved their disadvantage in arithmetic compared to the averages of their indigenous peers over a period of thirteen years. The performance of pupils of Antillean origin in arithmetic is the lowest of all the groups. Final-year assessment tests are also improving, particularly among pupils of Moroccan origin; they have almost reached the level of the best performing migrant group, the Surinamese Dutch. This improved performance at primary school is reflected in the steady growth in the proportion of pupils continuing to at least havo level.

#### *Many differences between the groups: Chinese pupils attend havo or vwo education more often than their indigenous counterparts*

The continued improvement in performance at the end of primary school is also apparent in secondary education. The disadvantage of pupils of non-Western origin is only being overcome so slowly because more and more native Dutch pupils are now studying at havo or vwo schools. Almost half of them attend a havo or vwo school, whereas the number of pupils of Turkish or Moroccan origin is only half as much as that again. In this respect the performance of pupils with a Surinamese or Antillean background is better, but they are still at a considerable disadvantage. On the other hand, some of the smaller non-Western groups exhibit no disadvantage at all; almost two out of three pupils with a Chinese background receive a havo or vwo education and pupils of Iranian origin also do very well at school.

#### *More problems in further education; Turkish group again vulnerable*

The school career in further education of non-Western pupils is not without problems; they have to repeat years more frequently, are more likely to fail their school-leaving exam or drop out of school. Pupils of Turkish origin tend to have the most problems, such as repeating years and failing the school-leaving exam. The language disadvantage which they left primary school with could be a factor here. The parental setting is most probably a major influence: in the adult ethnic minority population, it is the Turkish community who have the greatest difficulty with the Dutch language and who use it least in the home setting.

#### *Fall in school dropout rates among non-Western pupils in recent years*

When pupils from non-Western origin groups gain a secondary education qualification, large numbers of them go on to further education, in even greater numbers than their native Dutch counterparts. One positive recent trend is the fall in the numbers of pupils of non-Western

origin leaving secondary school early. In senior secondary vocational education (mbo), the fall in the dropout rate has levelled off for various groups of non-Western origin.

#### *Strong advance in higher education*

A strong catch-up effort among non-Western groups was seen in higher education in the 90s. The intake of young adults with a Turkish or Moroccan background doubled and the intake of the group with a Surinamese background also increased significantly. The gap between these groups and the intake numbers of native Dutch students is now markedly smaller than it was in the mid-90s. Streaming from a lower vocational school to a higher vocational school - from vmbo<sup>3</sup> to mbo<sup>4</sup>, from mbo to hbo<sup>5</sup> - has contributed significantly to the increased proportion of non-Western students in higher education. As many as half of first year hbo students with a Turkish, Moroccan or Surinamese background come from an mbo background. In a similar way as in secondary education and the mbo, studying in higher education seems to present more difficulties for students from non-Western groups: their progress is slower and they are more likely to drop out.

#### *Education level is rising, but a basic qualification is not attainable for many young people of non-Western origin*

The average level of education is slowly but surely improving along migrants who have left school. This rise is due, in large part, to the fact that more and more migrants now receive all of their education in the Netherlands (an increase in the second generation). First-generation migrants have frequently had not much more than a primary education. Despite the increase in the education level of non-Western migrants, it is still lagging far behind that of the indigenous groups and this is particularly true of those of Turkish or Moroccan origin. The standard of a basic qualification (a second-level mbo, havo or vwo qualification) is not attainable for many young non-Western adults. Fewer than half of those of Turkish or Moroccan origin between the ages of 20 and 35 years who are no longer in education and slightly more than half of those of Surinamese or Antillean origin in the same age group have a basic qualification. The second generation is much more likely to have attained a basic-qualification level than the first generation. Fortunately the number of non-Western migrants with a basic qualification has been increasing steadily since the beginning of the 90s.

#### *4 Unemployment benefits and work*

##### *The economic crisis hits non-Western migrants hard, especially young people and those with a low level of education*

Until 2008 the position of non-Western migrants on the employment market was relatively hopeful but they are now seriously feeling the pressure of a quickly deteriorating employment market, which is an indication of how sensitive non-Western groups are to economic fluctuations. The proportion of migrants in work is falling, and the pace of this decline is considerably faster in relative and absolute terms than it is for native Dutch people, whose net participation in the labour force has shown, as yet, no tendency to decline. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the unemployment figures of migrants. In the third quarter of 2008 unemployment statistics were rising, putting an end to the fall in unemployment figures that began after 2005. Although current unemployment figures are not as high as they were in 2005, the signs on the employment market do not bode well for the future.

Unemployment is rising particularly rapidly among young people from migrant groups. In the second quarter of 2009, 21% of non-Western young people were unemployed (as opposed to 10% of indigenous young people). Figures have not yet reached the 2005 level when 25% were unemployed, but the pace at which this increase is taking place leads to fears that this level will soon be reached. Those with little formal education are another category at risk. The combination of high numbers of young people and many of their members with little formal

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<sup>3</sup> [tr. note] vmbo – preparatory secondary vocational education

<sup>4</sup> [tr. note] mbo – senior secondary vocational education

<sup>5</sup> [tr. note] hbo- higher professional education

education means that non-Western groups are exceptionally vulnerable to adverse economic conditions. Another contributory factor is the large numbers of employees on temporary employment contracts. Flexi workers are losing their jobs in droves in these difficult economic times. In this sense, there are clear parallels with the period just after 2001. Many of the substantial gains in employment opportunities made in previous years have been the result of temporary jobs. Then, after the decline in the economy following 2001, many migrants lost their jobs. There are no reasons to believe that things will be significantly different this time.

#### *Rise in labour market position and entrepreneurship among ethnic communities*

Positive developments can also be seen on the employment market. Since 1996 there has been a considerable rise in the number of migrants and their descendants in employment, although fluctuations in the economic situation seem to have a substantial influence on the proportion of those in work among the ethnic communities. Members of the four larger non-Western groups who are in employment are increasingly reaching the higher echelons of the professional ladder. The second generation, in particular, has made enormous strides in the last decade. This is an indication of the growth of a substantial middle class among non-Western ethnic groups in the Netherlands.

The numbers of independent entrepreneurs have grown spectacularly among the ethnic minorities over the last ten years. One positive feature is the increasing expansion into a wider range of business activities made by these entrepreneurs and the improvement in their businesses' chances of survival in this period. Non-Western entrepreneurs conduct their businesses for a longer time, and many more businesses continue after their first year in business than they used to but, it must be said, indigenous entrepreneurs do perform considerably better in this respect. Of all the non-Western groups, people from the Chinese and Turkish groups are most likely to be entrepreneurs.

#### *Poverty and benefit-dependency are decreasing in non-Western households*

Benefit-dependency among non-Western ethnic groups has fallen over the longer term. From 2000 to 2007 poverty among non-Western households decreased, although there is a clear connection with wider economic developments; this highlights once more the vulnerability of the position of ethnic minorities.

Benefit-dependency is alarmingly high among refugee groups. Of the people of Somali origin in the Netherlands, no fewer than 36% receive social security (2009 figures), of the Afghan population 23% receive social security and of the Iraqis 30%.

### *5 Living and neighbourhoods*

#### *Small but growing number of neighbourhoods with a majority of ethnic minority residents*

Over the past decade the number of neighbourhoods with concentrations of non-Western ethnic minorities has increased. In just over 1% of all postcode districts in the Netherlands, the majority of residents are of non-Western origin. This amounts to a total of 50 districts, most of which are in the three largest cities. One in five or six people from an ethnic community with a non-Western background lives in a district which has a high concentration of migrants; this is more than it was ten years ago. The migrants are predominantly of Surinamese, Turkish or Moroccan origin and this proportion has remained unchanged despite the increasing diversity of the various population groups. Many prefer to live in a mixed community but, at the same time, they can see that many indigenous residents, themselves, are moving away from these mixed neighbourhoods.

#### *Residential segregation due to 'white flight' and the influx of immigrants from abroad*

Residential segregation is growing most rapidly in mixed neighbourhoods (at least 25% non-Western population) because immigrants arriving from abroad opt to live in districts which already have a considerable concentration of migrants. Of the non-Western Turkish and Moroccan immigrants entering the Netherlands in the period 1995-2008, about a quarter

settled directly in a neighbourhood with a majority of residents of non-Western origin. A similar number went to live in neighbourhoods where a quarter to a half was of non-Western origin. Immigrants from the smaller groups are much more likely to settle in predominantly white neighbourhoods. A second factor, which is closely linked to the first, is 'white flight'. As indigenous residents leave, room becomes available for the immigrants: in the period 1995-2008 almost one in three indigenous residents left the neighbourhoods 'which now have a mainly migrant population. 'White flight' from these neighbourhoods has decreased considerably in recent years, because fewer and fewer indigenous residents now live in these neighbourhoods in the first place.

*On balance 'black flight' is falling*

In the 90s, after the indigenous residents had left, residents from ethnic minority groups also started to move out: people of Surinamese origin, in particular, started to leave coloured neighbourhoods and, to a lesser extent, Turkish Dutch and Moroccan Dutch residents followed. More and more people from these groups are moving to live in satellite towns although the movement of these groups from concentration neighbourhoods has on the whole decreased in recent years.

The term 'flight', however, does not do justice to the ambiguous reality. The multi-cultural neighbourhood is still attractive to many people with a migrant background despite the existence of such problems as poverty, nuisance and degeneration. People are more attached to a neighbourhood because of their personal networks of family and friends and their ability to find their own kind of shops there, and the fear of not being accepted in a white suburb makes moving there less attractive.

*Less socializing with indigenous population, more with members of own ethnic group*

Because the non-Western population is increasing more rapidly than the Western population, the social contact that non-Western groups have with indigenous residents is falling in towns which have a substantial migrant population. Social contact with members of their own group is increasing although there are exceptions to this trend, such as the people of Surinamese origin who live in the three largest cities in the Netherlands. Since more and more from this group are moving to satellite towns from the larger cities, social contacts among people from their own community are no longer rising, and in The Hague, for example, they are even falling. In Almere, by way of a contrast, there has been a substantial rise.

*Some improvement in poorer-quality housing, especially through more owner-occupiers*

The rise in home ownership has meant a marked fall in poor-quality housing especially among residents of Moroccan or Turkish origin. Although these houses are generally cheaper than those of the indigenous population, only a small minority of houses can be classed as cheap housing (less than 120,000 EUR).

The considerable difference in square metres per occupant has decreased considerably over a succession of years because the average occupation level fell fastest among the Turkish Dutch and Moroccan Dutch residents (from 4.5 people in 1982 to 3 in 2006). The occupation level among the Surinamese Dutch and Antillean Dutch has remained at the same level as their indigenous counterparts since the mid-90s: about 2.3 people. At the same time the number of rooms in homes increased, more among Turkish Dutch, Moroccan Dutch and Surinamese Dutch communities than their native counterparts. The latter had an average of four rooms in 1982, similar to figures for migrant groups now. The improvement in housing quality is reflected in the increased satisfaction with their housing situation felt by people of Turkish or Moroccan origin. The remaining and still considerable difference in house size can be largely explained by the type of housing offered in the neighbourhoods where many migrants live, and their, on average, lower income.

*Greatest rise in proportion of income spent on housing since 1998 among tenants from migrant groups*

The proportion of take-home pay allocated by tenants for rent and other housing costs rose more quickly between 1998 and 2006 for people of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Antillean origin than for the indigenous population. It now ranges from more than 33% to almost 40% of income. The proportion of tenants receiving rent subsidy is higher among ethnic minority groups than their native counterparts. The lower proportion of income spent on housing by the Turkish Dutch and Moroccan Dutch is changing although expenditure on rent and other housing costs is still lower than that of other groups.

## 6 *Safety and criminality*

### *Increase in proportion of suspects in past five years, especially among minors*

Over the past five years the number of people in the Netherlands who are suspected of committing a crime has grown. Non-Western migrants continue to be recorded as a suspect much more often than their native counterparts. In 2007, 1.3% of the indigenous population who were older than 12 years were recorded as suspects; the corresponding figure for migrants of non-Western origin was 4.8%. Antillean Dutch and Moroccan Dutch were suspected of committing a criminal offence most often, 7.9% and 6.4% respectively. Of all the non-Western groups, those of Turkish origin have the lowest percentage of criminal suspects (3.9%). In all groups, the number of suspects recorded has grown over the past five years and we see this reflected particularly strongly among minors. Although the overrepresentation of non-Western suspects is still marked, it seems to have decreased in recent years.

### *Greater representation of first-generation Antilleans in crime figures*

Turkish Dutch and Moroccan Dutch suspects are mainly from the second-generation while Surinamese Dutch and Antillean Dutch suspects are more likely to be found among the first generation. There is a substantial difference between the different generations of the Antillean community. Whereas the number of suspects among first-generation Antilleans has levelled off in the last ten years, the number of second-generation suspects has shown a marked increase. Among all the other non-Western groups, the proportion of suspects has risen for both generations.

### *Often Halt punishments for young people of Antillean, Moroccan and Somali origin*

The overrepresentation of non-Western minority groups in suspect records is reflected in Halt statistics. Halt is intended for young people between 12 and 18 years old who are in trouble with the police for the first or second time and who have committed a fairly minor criminal offence. Of all minors, Halt receives comparatively more referrals regarding young people of Antillean, Moroccan or Somali origin. Chinese Dutch youths are referred less frequently than their native peers and the numbers of youths of Afghan and Turkish origin and from other non-Western groups referred to Halt are also less than average.

### *Non-western migrants are more likely to be victims of crime and feel more unsafe*

Non-western ethnic communities are not only suspected of crime more often, but they are also more likely to be victims of a crime. This is solely attributable to the fact that migrants are, on average, younger, live very often in urban areas and find themselves in disadvantaged socio-economic positions, for example they are more likely to come from broken homes. Victim statistics fell slightly among the indigenous population in the period between 2005 and 2008 but not for non-Western ethnic minorities.

Feelings of insecurity are more widespread among non-Western groups than their native counterparts but feelings of safety have increased in recent years, for both the indigenous population and non-Western ethnic minorities.

### *Non-Western ethnic minorities more positive about the police than the indigenous Dutch*

Although non-Western ethnic minorities are more affected by criminality – as both offender or victim – than native Dutch citizens, surprisingly this has not resulted in them having more negative views on the police. On the contrary, all ethnic groups are more positive about the police than their indigenous counterparts, and this is particularly true for first-generation groups.

### *7 Socio-cultural position*

#### *Little movement in interethnic contacts*

Statistics over the period from 1994 to 2006 indicate that there has been little change in the frequency of social contact between the ethnic communities and the indigenous community; indeed some findings have even indicated a decrease in the number of these inter-community contacts. Whilst the general picture is fairly static, there are, however, clear differences between the different ethnic minorities. In this period, the Moroccan Dutch and Surinamese Dutch groups tended to socialize more with their indigenous counterparts, while the pattern of socialization changed little among the Antillean Dutch group. Experience with members of the Turkish community indicates that they are now focussing more on their own group than they did in the past. Members of the second generation of all the ethnic groups associate more with their indigenous peers in their free time than the first generation. Among the second-generation of Turkish or Moroccan origin, however, the level of contact with members of their own ethnic group in their leisure time also increased.

Studies into the static nature of socialization between ethnic minorities and the indigenous population highlight issues such as the increased concentration of non-Western groups in certain neighbourhoods, which is seen as a barrier to interaction between ethnic minorities and the indigenous community. However, this issue is not entirely to blame for the stagnation in social integration between the native Dutch population and ethnic minorities; the current hardened social climate and the negative image that different groups have of each other could be important factors here.

#### *Greater mosque attendance among second-generation Moroccan Dutch community*

Most members of the Turkish Dutch and Moroccan Dutch communities view themselves as Muslims; this remained unaltered in the years from 1998 to 2006, even among the second generation. More than half of the Turkish and Moroccan Muslims rarely attend a mosque and this number is increasing, particularly among the first generation. Remarkably, a considerable group of second-generation Moroccans now attend the mosque just as frequently, on average, as the first generation; this was not the case a number of years ago when second-generation Moroccans very rarely attended a mosque. This seems to indicate that there might be a religious revival occurring among this group, but their religious convictions do not appear to support this hypothesis. The second generation attaches less importance to religion-based schools than the first generation. This is particularly true for the Moroccan Dutch (of both generations) but both generations of Moroccan or Turkish origin still have a strong preference for a Muslim partner with little change occurring in the years 1998-2006.

The picture is more straightforward among the Surinamese Dutch and Antillean Dutch communities. On the whole it seems as if their interest in religion is waning, particularly among the second generation of Antillean Dutch, but there is a section of the first generation which is, in fact, becoming more religious.

#### *Rapid improvement in Dutch language skills among Moroccan Dutch*

First generation immigrants of Moroccan and Turkish origin have the greatest difficulty in mastering the Dutch language. Although first-generation Antillean Dutch experience a few problems in language proficiency, these cannot be compared to those of the first generation of Turkish or Moroccan origin. The second generation appears to have very few difficulties learning Dutch and there is, in fact, little difference in Dutch language proficiency between the second generations of the non-Western groups in the survey.

Although there are still signs that a considerable number of language problems still exist, especially among the first generation, all the indications seem to be pointing to an increased use of, and proficiency, in the Dutch language. Over the last ten years, people of Moroccan origin, in particular, have started to use Dutch more and more, and this has improved their proficiency. The Moroccan Dutch mothers of school-age children have made striking progress.

The inner-direction of the Turkish group is reflected in their incomplete mastery of the Dutch language. Despite some progress, Turkish Dutch people speak the language less competently and are also far more likely to use their own language in the family situation than all the other groups.

## 8 *Mutual perceptions*

### *Attitudes towards a multi-ethnic society slowly becoming less negative*

There is a degree of unrest about the multi-ethnic society among a fairly sizable group of the indigenous Dutch population. Statistical data which describes current trends indicate that people were most negative during the turbulent, early years of the new millennium, during the national and international events after 9/11, during the rise of the politician Pim Fortuijn and after the murder of Theo van Gogh. These attitudes are reflected in the generally more negative view of the indigenous groups as a whole, but also in individual opinions: people felt more threatened by the presence of non-Western ethnic minorities in the period between 2000 and 2005. This outlook seems to have mellowed to some extent in recent years but the fact still remains that a sizable proportion of the indigenous Dutch population has a negative attitude towards ethnic minorities. Some 40% thinks, for instance, that there are too many people of different nationalities living in this country.

### *Economic situation has little influence on views of ethnic minorities*

The effects of the recent credit crisis on the attitudes towards ethnic minorities are not reflected in the statistics. It certainly seems to be the case that the economic situation (unemployment figures and consumer confidence) has had little influence on how ethnic minorities are viewed. Surprisingly, attitudes have tended to become more positive, rather than more negative, during the crisis and it seems as if the economic downturn has pushed discussions on minorities in the Netherlands into the background.

## 9 *The social situation of young people*

### *Improvement in the home situation of young people from ethnic minorities; more single-parent families*

Ethnic minority children are much more likely to grow up in a family situation with interrelated parenting and behavioural problems than their indigenous peers; often these problems are related to single-parent households and poverty. Since the mid-90s the number of young people in single-parent families has increased in almost all of the groups. This means that children of non-Western origin clearly have a much larger chance of growing up in poverty than their native counterparts, but the actual percentage of children growing up in poverty has fallen in all ethnic groups, the fall being most marked for Moroccan Dutch and Turkish Dutch children.

### *Fall in teenage pregnancies*

Young women of non-Western origin are much more likely to become teenage mothers than their indigenous peers; the greatest numbers are among young women of Antillean or Surinamese origin. Teenage births have fallen dramatically in all the ethnic groups; the number of Moroccan Dutch and Turkish Dutch teenage mothers has fallen to such an extent that any differences with their native counterparts have almost disappeared. A major contributory factor here is the later age at which Moroccan Dutch and Turkish Dutch women now marry.

### *Most young people like school*

Pupils from all the ethnic groups like school. There is a relatively small group which experiences a great deal of pressure at school but, apart from Surinamese pupils, all the children from ethnic minorities experience more pressure at school than indigenous children.

### *More health problems among children of non-Western origin*

Children from ethnic minority communities generally feel less healthy than native Dutch children. Cultural differences in diet and physical exercise are probably a factor here in addition to socio-economic differences; children from ethnic minorities, particularly the girls, are generally less physically active and are less likely to be members of a sports club.

### *More problem behaviour among children and young people of non-Western origin*

Problem behaviour which is externalized such as aggression, unacceptable behaviour and peer conflicts is more often reported among ethnic minority children and young people than it is among their indigenous counterparts. Psychosomatic disorders - often an indicator of psychiatric problems - occur more frequently among young people of non-Western origin; this can be explained to some extent by the differences in family circumstances and the socio-economic situation but immigration factors could also play a role here.

### *Great variation in unhealthy lifestyle*

Young people of Turkish or Moroccan origin are less likely to drink alcohol. Young Moroccans smoke less than young people from other ethnic groups; like their indigenous counterparts, more Turkish and Surinamese young people have stopped smoking in recent years. Young people of Surinamese and Antillean origin are sexually active at a younger age than their native counterparts. Turkish and Moroccan boys are sexually active at a young age more frequently than their native counterparts, but girls of Turkish or Moroccan origin are generally less experienced sexually than their native peers.

## *10 Women in education and in the employment market*

### *Girls from ethnic minorities are catching up at school*

Women and girls from ethnic minorities are performing better in education, even better than the men and boys from these same groups and the indigenous women too. At every stage in their school career, women and girls of non-Western origin are doing better or slightly better than the men or boys. The differences between the sexes which still existed ten years ago have now disappeared. Differences in the final Cito test in the last year of primary school, for example, or entry to havo and vwo education (only the Turkish Dutch and Moroccan Dutch girls) and higher education have all levelled out and, in some cases this has developed into a leading position. The disadvantage compared to indigenous pupils is, however, still considerable.

### *Rise in employment participation among women of Turkish or Moroccan origin*

Employment participation rose in all groups over the past ten years, probably due to the rise in education levels. This increase was most marked among women of Turkish or Moroccan origin: their employment participation doubled, but is still - at about 40% - relatively low. This is in great contrast to the level of participation of indigenous and Surinamese women, which is around 60%, with participation by Antillean women between the two at 49%.

Another development which has occurred is a reduction in the dependency of women from the ethnic groups on flexible contracts. Similar trends can also be seen for men from the ethnic minorities but because these were less marked than they were for the women, the difference between the two sexes has become smaller on balance.



*Unemployment also rising among ethnic minority women*

Initially, the impact of the recent rise in unemployment was greater on ethnic minority men but now women are also being affected. As in previous economic crises, unemployment is rising much more quickly among ethnic minority women than their indigenous counterparts.

*Developments in economic self-reliance taking place slowly*

Developments in the employment market over the last decade have led to a slightly greater level of economic independence among women in all the groups, while the difference between the women and men has become smaller. On the other hand, the differences between the various groups of women have changed very little or not at all. Of all the women, the Surinamese Dutch women have achieved the greatest economic independence, not just because of their relatively high employment participation, but because they are very often in full-time employment or substantial part-time jobs.

*Mérove Gijsberts and Jaco Dagevos*

'Is integration successful in the Netherlands?' was the heading above an article in the Dutch journal, *Vrij Nederland*, about a year ago. The article wanted to inject a different, positive note about the level of integration of non-Western groups. Many of the researchers and politicians who were quoted in *Vrij Nederland* thought the prevalent attitude - integration had failed completely - had been greatly exaggerated.

Although this may have been a refreshing interlude - a positively orchestrated survey of integration, far distant from contemporary mutterings in political and social debates - the outlook is still gloomy. Positive developments in integration may certainly be taking place but to paraphrase Sadik Harchaoui, the president of Forum, the Dutch Institute for Multicultural Development, it does not feel like it. Juxtaposed with the positive developments, there are reports of disadvantage and nuisance, of criminality and dropping out of school, unemployment and an increased focus on one's own ethnic group and religion.

In short, integration is a topic on which opinions are extremely mixed, and positive and negative news is received and interpreted very differently. Good information on a wide range of integration indicators is important if a well-founded judgement is to be delivered; the Annual Report on Integration is one of these sources of information. The report's most important aim is to outline the current situation vis-à-vis integration in the Netherlands and the developments in this field. The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) and Statistics Netherlands (CBS), at the request of the Dutch Minister of Housing, Communities and Integration, have taken turns to compile this report since 2007 and it is a continuation of the research papers which have been published by the SCP since the beginning of the 90s. This Annual Report is the twelfth in the series of research papers and is published by the SCP, with the aim of presenting an assessment of the situation of non-Western groups in this country.

This edition of the Annual Report on Integration focuses on the trends in integration. Certain subject areas (demography, civic integration, education, employment, the housing market and spatial segregation, criminality, socio-cultural position and perceptions) were taken and two specific categories (young people and women) chosen in an attempt to illustrate how the position of non-Western ethnic minorities and their children has developed in recent years. We thought that this was an important angle of approach, as experience from the past and from other countries has shown that it takes time for ethnic minorities to establish a position in society. A disadvantage is not likely to be eliminated within one generation and this is, in itself, enough reason for a longer-term view of integration to be useful. It is now perfectly possible, in a Dutch context, to draw comparisons over a number of years and between generations.

Many members of the four largest non-Western ethnic minorities have been in the Netherlands for a considerable period of time, and this makes it possible to determine which developments have taken place in the various fields. In addition, the size of the second generation is such that its impact is now felt in a number of fields.

#### *Target groups and terminology*

Integration policy focuses mainly on groups who have a non-Western foreign background, and this includes those with at least one parent who was born in Turkey, Morocco, Surinam, the Dutch Antilles, Aruba or a large number of other non-Western countries in Asia and Africa. Those born outside the Netherlands are classed as first generation and those born in the Netherlands as second generation. Over recent years, increasing numbers of people from Middle and Eastern Europe have been considered within the framework of integration policy

but the 2009 Annual Report has excluded this group from its considerations to a large extent, except for the chapter on demography. The reasons for this are partly related to our choice of subject - the study of trends - as there is little information available, to date, on the evolution of the structural and socio-cultural position of groups from Middle and Eastern Europe. Over the course of next year, fieldwork will supply the necessary information for an extensive SCP research study which is to be published on the position of Polish residents in the Netherlands. We expect that this report, in combination with the findings of recent research studies (e.g. Weltevrede et al. 2009), will provide a good picture of the social situation of this group.

Two-thirds of all the people in the non-Western groups belong to one of the four large ethnic groups of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean origin. In addition, there are a large number of smaller groups, including refugee groups, which are included in the non-Western category. The aim was to distinguish as precisely as possible within the non-Western groups, the main categories being the four large ethnic groups, the larger refugee groups (people of Iranian, Iraqi, Somali and Afghan origin) and people of Chinese origin. The available material does not always enable a finely-tuned distinction to be made and the degree of distinction varies according to topic. The available statistics are also outlined in each chapter. An extensive survey of the refugee groups previously mentioned and of the Chinese community in the Netherlands is now being undertaken and a detailed report, similarly to one drawn up on the Polish group, is expected next year.

Terminology: from 'allochtoon' to non-Western ethnic minority

In this Annual Report we have used the term 'non-Western ethnic minorities and their descendants' as we are no longer using the term 'allochtoon' which was the term used in previous Annual Reports. The reason for this was that this term was encountering increasing resistance; the word-pair 'allochtoon' and 'autochtoon' was said to be stigmatizing; it sharpened the distinctions between the two sections of society and carried with it the inference that 'allochtoons' were not part of society but stood outside it.

We could have a lengthy discussion about whether the term 'allochtoon' actually has the effect that has been attributed to it but SCP studies have always used this term as a neutral term for groups which originally came from outside the Netherlands. We followed the definition used in the CBS population statistics for non-Western 'allochtoon'. However, if this term no longer has neutral connotations, this is a good reason for looking for alternative terms. We have therefore opted for 'non-Western ethnic minorities and their descendants'. For reasons of style we sometimes use the term 'people with a non-western foreign background' but this must then be understood as including the second generation.

The name used to refer to the various ethnic minority groups has also changed - for more or less the same reasons that the use of 'allochtoon' has changed. It means that we no longer refer to Turks and Moroccans as this would seem to suggest that they are separate groups in the Netherlands. It would also be a misnomer because many of the people in these groups have since acquired Dutch nationality. We therefore talk about Turkish Dutch and Moroccan Dutch or people of Turkish or Moroccan origin and we have, of course, adopted the same policy for other ethnic groups.

Incidentally, it seems as if every term used to refer to 'allochtoon' eventually meets with criticism. Other terms which have been used in the past such as 'foreigners', 'migrants', 'ethnic minorities' and now 'allochtoon', have all met the same fate, changing from apparently neutral terms into terms with a stigmatizing and excluding connotation. It is perfectly conceivable that the term 'non-Western ethnic minorities' will be a subject of discussion in a number of years' time too.

This edition of the Annual Report on Integration has been drawn up and edited by the SCP.